Prospective study of avian influenza transmission to humans in egypt by Kayali, Ghazi et al.
STUDY PROTOCOL Open Access
Prospective study of avian influenza transmission
to humans in Egypt
Ghazi Kayali
1*, Richard J Webby
1, Xiaoping Xiong
2, Lobna S Sherif
3, Esmat A El-Ghafar
3, Mohamed A Ali
4
Abstract
Background: The highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus remains a public health threat and
continues to cause outbreaks among poultry as well as human infections. Since its appearance, the virus has
spread to numerous geographic areas and is now considered endemic in Egypt and other countries. Most studies
on human H5N1 cases were conducted to investigate outbreak situations and were not designed to address
fundamental questions about the epidemiology of human infection with H5N1 viruses. Our objective for this study
is to answer these questions by estimating the prevalence and incidence rates of human cases and determine
associated risk and protective factors in areas where H5N1 viruses are endemic.
Methods/Design: We designed a 3-year prospective cohort study of 1000 individuals of various exposure levels to
poultry in Egypt. At onset, we will collect sera to estimate baseline antibody titers against AI viruses H4-H16. Two
follow-up visits are scheduled at 1-year intervals following initial enrollment. At follow-up, we will also collect sera
to measure changes in antibody titers over time. Thus, annual prevalence rates as well as incidence rates of
infection will be calculated. At each visit, exposure and other data will be collected using a specifically tailored
questionnaire. This data will be used to measure risk and protective factors associated with infection. Subjects will
be asked to contact the study team any time they have influenza-like illness (ILI). In this case, the study team will
verify infection by rapid influenza A test and obtain swabs from the subject’s contacts to isolate and characterize
viruses causing acute infection.
Discussion: Epidemiologic studies at the influenza human-animal interface are rare, hence many questions
concerning transmission, severity, and extent of infection at the population level remain unanswered. We believe
that our study will help tackle and clarify some of these issues.
Background
Although the recent influenza pandemic was caused by
a H1N1 virus, the pandemic threat of the highly patho-
genic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus remains. Out-
breaks of the virus in poultry and cases of human
infection continue to occur. Severe economic loss is a
usual consequence of H5N1 infection in poultry, as
mortality and morbidity rates are high.
Exposure to poultry is the most important risk factor
for humans becoming infected with HPAI viruses.
Bridges et al. examined the sera of poultry workers in
Hong Kong between the years 1997 and 1998 during
which an outbreak of H5N1 was occurring in poultry.
Using a nested case-control study design, they found
that working in retail poultry operations, butchering
poultry, feeding poultry, and preparing poultry for res-
taurants were factors significantly associated with sero-
positivity for antibodies against an H5 virus [1].
Similarly, in a case-control study of risk factors of infec-
tion with H5N1 viruses in Hong Kong in 1997, Mounts
et al. found that cases were more likely to be exposed to
live poultry than controls (OR = 4.5, 95% CI 2.1-21.7)
[2]. In another case-control study, Dinh et al. reported
that exposure to sick or dead poultry was a significant
determinant of infection with H5N1 virus in a Vietna-
mese population in 2004 [3]. Also in Vietnam, Tran
et al. noted that 9 of 10 H5N1 patients were exposed to
poultry, 8 of whom had direct contact with birds [4]. In
a population-based surveillance study in a rural area in
Vietnam, a dose-response relationship between poultry
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household (odds ratio, 1.04; 95% confidence interval,
0.96-1.12), sick or dead poultry in the household but
with no direct contact (odds ratio, 1.14; 95% confidence
interval, 1.06-1.23), and direct contact with sick poultry
(odds ratio, 1.73; 95% confidence interval, 1.58-1.89) [5].
Similar evidence comes from Thailand where H5N1
infections in birds and humans have been reported.
Among 12 confirmed cases who came from areas where
poultry were infected, 9 lived in households whose back-
yard chickens died, and 8 reported direct contact with
dead chickens [6]. In another case-control study, Aree-
chokchai et al. found that touching dead chickens was a
significant risk factor for infection with H5N1 virus (OR
= 29.0 95% CI 2.7-308.2). A case series of Turkish
patients revealed that all 8 H5N1 virus infected patients
had a history of contact with ill or dead chickens [7]. In
a recent rero-epidemiologic study of 700 rural Cambo-
dians, 18 individuals were sero-positive for H5N1 anti-
bodies and were more likelyt or e p o r ts w i m m i n gi n
community ponds [8].
All these studies took place in an outbreak situation
and, by design, can only provide information on poten-
tial risk factors and perhaps the clinical profile of H5N1
human cases. Many fundamental questions remain
unanswered: what are the true rates of infections among
humans exposed to birds, do sub-clinical infections
occur, and what are the true case-fatality rates. Such
questions can be answered by conducting prospective
epidemiological studies in geographic areas where H5N1
virus is endemic.
Initially appearing in Egypt in 2006, the H5N1 virus
has since became endemic. In 2009 and 2010, Egypt
reported the highest number of human infections with
the virus and is currently the third country with the
most reported cases following Indonesia and Vietnam
[9]. Hence, Egypt is the ideal place to study the epide-
miology of human infection with HPAI H5N1 viruses.
Here we describe a prospective cohort study that aims
to determine prevalence, incidence, and determinants of
human infection with avian influenza (AI) viruses.
Study Objectives and Hypothesis
This study has three primary objectives:
￿ To estimate prevalence of AI in poultry-exposed
and non-exposed human populations.
￿ To estimate the incidence of AI in poultry-exposed
and non-exposed human populations.
￿ To investigate risk factors associated with AI infec-
tions in occupationally-exposed poultry workers.
We hypothesize that by enrolling cohorts of indivi-
duals exposed and non-exposed to poultry and
measuring avian influenza antibodies in their sera over a
defined time period, we will be able to calculate true
prevalence and incidence rates of AI infections. We also
hypothesize that, by using a detailed exposure question-
naire, we will be able to determine risk and protective
factors associated with infection.
By design, this study will also allow us to investigate
patterns in transmission of AI to household contacts of
AI cases as well as isolating and characterizing AI
viruses causing acute illness in humans. This can be
achieved by obtaining nasal swabs from cohort members
reporting influenza-like illness (ILI) and their household
contacts and testing for the presence of influenza A
viruses.
Methods/Design
Study population and setting
The AI viruses under study are usually shed by live
birds and transmitted to other birds through aerosolized
secretions or environmental contamination. Thus we
believe that individuals working with live birds are at an
increased risk of infection due to their exposure to the
environment and secretions of their poultry. Any indivi-
dual who had an occupational contact with poultry in
the previous five years will be considered exposed. Indi-
viduals working on poultry farms, poultry wet markets,
or keeping limited numbers of poultry in their backyard,
are considered exposed. Unexposed individuals must
have no occupational exposure to poultry in their life-
time and must also not be exposed to poultry purchased
from live bird markets. We will enroll 750 poultry
exposed individuals from households, farms, and live
poultry markets and 250 non-exposed controls.
Exposed subjects will be enrolled at villages in Egypt
where poultry production is located. The majority of
the human cases of HPAI H5N1 infection in Egypt were
located in the Nile Delta region in the North of the
country. Our cohort of exposed subjects will be
assembled from villages from 3 governorates in this area
as well as 2 governorates south of Cairo where human
cases of AI were reported. Hence, 5 villages will make
up 5 field sites. From each village, we will enroll 150
individuals with exposure to poultry. The control group,
i.e., individuals not occupationally exposed to poultry,
will be enrolled from urban Cairo, the capital of Egypt.
The study sites are highlighted in figure 1.
At each field site, we will invite poultry farm workers and
poultry vendors at wet markets to participate. Following
this, the sampling quota will be fulfilled by enrolling back-
yard farmers. All members of a household where poultry is
raised will be enrolled. When the 150-participants quota is
reached, enrollment at the specific site stops.
Controls will be enrolled in urban Cairo. Households
will be selected from neighborhoods without live bird
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All members of a household will be enrolled.
In this study, only children under 2 years of age will
be excluded. Current data shows that almost all H5N1
cases were in individuals older than 2 years. This could
be explained by the fact that these infants are not yet
mobile and hence do not have access to poultry. Thus
we will exclude this age group as the risks cannot be
justified by scientific evidence. We expect that our sam-
ple will include children, females, and ethnic minorities
reflecting the distribution of these groups in the general
Egyptian population.
This study was approved by the St. Jude Children’s
Research Hospital (SJCRH) IRB (USA) and by the
National Research Centre ethics committee (Egypt).
Study design and procedures
A schematic of the study design is presented in figure 2.
We designed a 3-year prospective cohort study to com-
pare individuals with occupational exposure to poultry
with non-poultry exposed adult controls for evidence of
incident and previous infections with AI viruses. At the
start of this study, study staff will determine eligibility,
obtain informed consent, and a blood sample will be
obtained from study volunteers to establish baseline
levels of antibodies against avian influenza types
H4-H12. Subjects will be interviewed regarding their
exposures, medical history, and behaviors using a close-
ended questionnaire specifically tailored for this study.
After one year, study subjects will be interviewed again
to note any changes in exposure variables. At this time,
another blood sample will be obtained and tested for
any changes in influenza-specific antibody levels. The
same procedures will be repeated at the final visit after
another year. On follow up visits 1 and 2, study staff
will interview the subject using a modified questionnaire
that is designed to capture changes in baseline enroll-
ment variables.
S t u d yv o l u n t e e r sw i l lb eg i v e ns p e c i f i ci n s t r u c t i o n st o
note if they have any ILI symptoms and will be asked to
contact study staff. If a subject is verified to have ILI
symptoms, study staff will obtain 2 nasal swabs to be
tested for the presence of influenza viruses. One of each
of these swabs will be tested immediately for Flu A by
using a rapid test kit. If any of these test positive, then
study staff will obtain 2 nasal swabs from household
contacts who are also enrolled in the study and com-
plete the ILI verification form for each subject providing
swabs. Furthermore, a blood sample will be collected
from subjects with ILI symptoms for the purpose of har-
vesting peripheral blood mononuclear cells for immuno-
logical studies. The second swab will be tested by RT
PCR; if influenza is present, further laboratory analysis
will be performed to determine the type of virus present
and the results will be confirmed at St. Jude Children’s
Research Hospital (SJCRH).
Specimen handling
A trained phlebotomist will collect a tube of blood
(7.5ml) in serum separator tubes. The blood will be
a l l o w e dt oc l o ta tr o o mt e m p e r a t u r e ,t h e nk e p to ni c e
until it arrives at the laboratory on the same day as col-
lection where the specimens will be then centrifuged.
Serum specimens will be aliqouted into multiple cryo-
vials, labeled and preserved at -20°C until ready for
laboratory study.
Figure 1 Egypt’sp o l i t i c a lm a p . Governorates were enrollment
sites are located are highlighted.
Figure 2 Schematic of the study design.
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medium and kept on ice until received in the lab where
they will be stored at -80°C until ready for laboratory
study. Blood collected for peripheral cells will be col-
lected in tubes containing heparin, then kept on ice
until it arrives at the laboratory on the same day as col-
lection where the specimens will be then processed.
Reverse transcriptase (RT) PCR positive swabs for influ-
enza A virus will be subtyped and will be shipped to
SJCRH for confirmation and further processing.
Laboratory analysis
Sera will be screened for human antibodies against AI
viruses (types H4-H12) using a microneutralization
assay at a dilution of 1:10. Sera that screen positive will
be further studied through a microneutralization assay
procedure and full titer determined.
Due to the potential cross-reactivity of antibodies
against human influenza viruses confounding serological
assays against AI viruses, we will also evaluate the sera
against recently circulating human influenza viruses.
S t u d ys e r aw i l lb ee x a m i n e df o ra n t i b o d i e sa g a i n s t
human influenza types H1 and H3 using a hemaggluti-
nation inhibition procedure.
Swabs obtained from subjects reporting ILI symptoms
and their household contacts will be screened for the
presence of influenza A viruses by a rapid test. After
arriving at the lab, specimens will be screened by RT
PCR for presence of flu A by amplifying the M gene.
Blood obtained from subjects reporting ILI symptoms
will be used to collect peripheral blood mononuclear
cells for immunological studies.
Sample Size Calculation and Statistical Analysis
Population size estimates necessary to determine a dif-
ference of 19-29% in enrollment seroprevalence, with
5% significance level and 85-92% power, using STPlan
(University of Texas) for comparing two binomial popu-
lations, revealed that 250 non-exposed controls and 600
exposed individuals will be needed.
Prevalence rates of infection with AI viruses will be
calculated at baseline enrollment, follow-up, and final
visits with 95% Confidence Intervals (CI). These rates
will be stratified by age, gender, and exposure level.
Annual incidence rates will be assessed based on positive
status defined as a 2-fold increase of antibody titers between
baseline and follow-up and between follow-up and the final
visit. Incidence rates will be calculated with their 95% CI
and stratified by exposure level, gender, and age.
Risk or protective factors correlated with infection will
be measured using the enrollment questionnaire.
Changes in these factors over the study duration will be
captured using the follow-up questionnaire. The odds
ratios of prevalent infection with AI viruses and the
relative risks of incident infection with AI viruses will be
calculated based on each risk/protective variable. Multi-
ple regression models will be used to determine risk and
protective factors correlated with prevalence and inci-
dence of AI infection among humans.
Discussion
The circulation of pandemic H1N1 viruses in HPAI H5N1
endemic areas raises fears of emergence of a highly patho-
genic virus efficient at human to human transmission.
Given the zoonotic nature of influenza, such an event is
most likely to occur at the human-animal interface.
In addition, the scarcity of well-designed prospective
epidemiological studies of zoonotic influenza transmission
highlights the need for such studies and the importance of
the one presented here.
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